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Involuntary medical treatment—treatment that is administered at the
direction of the government, over the objection of the patient—potentially
compromises several individual constitutional interests. By definition,
involuntary medical treatment burdens the individual’s interest in
making an autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment, an interest
protected by the Due Process Clause.1 Involuntary medical treatment
that is administered for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime
additionally threatens the individual’s interest in avoiding unreasonable
governmental intrusions upon his privacy and personal security, an
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.2
Like all individual constitutional rights, rights under both the Due
Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment can be outweighed by sufficiently
important government interests.3 To determine whether involuntary
medical treatment violates the Due Process Clause, courts ask whether
the government’s interest that the treatment advances is important
enough to justify compromising the individual’s interest in making an
autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment.4 Involuntary treatment
must also be medically appropriate, but any physical harms that the
treatment might cause are not balanced directly against the government’s
interest. For example, if the government sought to administer involuntary
antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering a criminal
defendant competent to stand trial, a court would ask whether the
medications were medically appropriate, but would not ask whether the
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Other interests potentially compromised by
involuntary medical treatment include the First Amendment right to religious freedom
and the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. These
additional interests are beyond the scope of this Article.
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90 (1989) (“Because no constitutional
rights are absolute, virtually every constitutional case involves the question whether the
government’s action is justified by a sufficient purpose.”). One scholar has suggested
that “[t]he only truly absolute right may be the First Amendment freedom to believe.”
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Can We Rely on the Alleged Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy to Secure Genetic Privacy in the Courtroom?, 31 SETON HALL L.
REV. 926, 928 (2001).
4. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (“In determining whether
a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary
to balance ‘the liberty of the individual’ and ‘the demands of an organized society.’”
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
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government’s interest in bringing the defendant to trial justified the
potential harms of the medications.5 Involuntary antipsychotic medications
would be prohibited if the harmfulness made the treatment medically
inappropriate.
To determine whether involuntary medical treatment violates the
Fourth Amendment, courts ask whether the government’s interest that
the treatment advances is important enough to justify compromising the
individual’s interest in protecting his privacy and physical security.6
Any physical harms that the treatment might cause are balanced directly
against the government’s interest. For example, if the government sought to
compel a criminal defendant to undergo surgery to remove a bullet from
his body for the purpose of proving that he had committed a crime, a
court would ask whether the government’s interest in obtaining the
bullet justified the potential harms of the surgery.7 Involuntary surgery
would be unreasonable, and therefore prohibited, if the government’s interest
did not justify the harmfulness.
5. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003). The Sell test is
presented infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
6. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“The test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment . . . requires a balancing of the need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”). In many Fourth
Amendment cases, a warrant issued upon probable cause, or probable cause and exigent
circumstances that excuse the failure to obtain a warrant, establishes a sufficiently
important government interest to justify a search or seizure. See William J. Stuntz, O.J.
Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV.
842, 847 (2001) (“Whether the police suspect a house shelters a murder weapon or a
stash of marijuana, the standard is the same: the police cannot search unless they have
probable cause to believe evidence of crime will be found, plus either a warrant or the
ability to show that getting one was not feasible.”). In these cases, courts consider that
the “Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need”
through the warrant and probable cause requirements. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 559 (1978). In other Fourth Amendment cases, though, probable cause is not
sufficient to justify a search or seizure. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that
“[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates
expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be
‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 759 (1985). Involuntary medical treatment cases are thus a special kind of Fourth
Amendment case, in which the existence of probable cause does not necessarily mean
that a search is reasonable. Some scholars have referred to these cases as involving
“hyper-intrusive” searches. See Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother?
The Need for Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RUTGERS
L. REV. 547, 548 (2003) (proposing category); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced
Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 108 (2002)
(adopting category).
7. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 760–62.
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This Article contends that when the government seeks to administer
involuntary antipsychotic medications to an incompetent8 criminal defendant,
the Due Process Clause analysis—which asks whether involuntary medical
treatment is medically appropriate, not whether it is reasonable—
inadequately protects the defendant’s interest in being free from physical
harms that are not justified by the government’s interest in rendering
him competent to stand trial. Courts routinely decide that administering
involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent criminal defendants is
medically appropriate, but arguably the question that courts should be
deciding is whether administering involuntary antipsychotic medications
is reasonable—that is, whether the government’s interest in bringing the
defendant to trial is important enough to justify the harms of involuntary
antipsychotic medications.
Consider, for example, the case of Herbert Evans. Evans has a long
history of paranoid schizophrenia.9 In 2002, when he was seventy-four
years old, Evans was charged with several federal offenses, but because
of his paranoid delusions, he was found incompetent to stand trial.10
Evans refused to take voluntarily the antipsychotic medications that
might have alleviated his delusions and rendered him competent to stand
trial.11 The government then sought an order allowing the antipsychotic
medications to be administered involuntarily.12
In support of its decision granting the government’s request to
administer involuntary antipsychotic medications to Evans, the district
court wrote a brief opinion stating that “the government has shown
sufficient proof” of all of the findings required for an order allowing
involuntary medications, including a finding “that such medicine is
medically appropriate.”13 The Fourth Circuit reversed, in part because
the district court was “without adequate information” to conclude that
antipsychotic medications were medically appropriate for Evans, “an
elderly man with diabetes, hypertension, and asthma who takes a number
of medications to treat these conditions.”14 The Fourth Circuit then set
8. “Incompetent” as used in the Article means “incompetent to stand trial,” unless
otherwise specified. The criteria for competence to stand trial are discussed infra note
108.
9. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Evans’s delusions
of governmental conspiracies . . . have persisted longer than 40 years . . . .”); United
States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (W.D. Va. 2003) (referring to Evans’s “long
history of treatment for psychiatric problems” and “paranoid schizophrenia of a longstanding nature”).
10. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d. at 670.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. United States v. Evans, No. 102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *2 (W.D. Va.
Mar. 18, 2004).
14. Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41.
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out a long list of requirements that the government must satisfy to
support a finding of medical appropriateness, including the requirement
of a detailed treatment plan specifying particular medications, dosages,
and likely side effects.15
On remand, the district court found that the government’s evidence
satisfied most of the Fourth Circuit’s requirements.16 The district court
ruled, though, that the government had not submitted a sufficiently
detailed plan for responding to the possibility that antipsychotic
medications would exacerbate Evans’s diabetes.17 The court therefore
authorized the government to implement its involuntary antipsychotic
medication treatment plan, but only until Evans’s diabetes becomes
insulin-dependent: “I will direct that, in the event that Evans’[s] diabetes
worsens to the point of requiring daily insulin shots, the government
must cease treatment with the antipsychotic currently in use and return
to this court with a new proposal.”18 The Fourth Circuit issued a per
curiam opinion summarily affirming the district court’s order permitting
the government to administer involuntary antipsychotic medications.19
That the district court is prepared to allow the government to continue
administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to Evans until he
requires daily injections of insulin, even though the court has not
explained why the charges against Evans justify this level of harm,20

15. Id. at 240–42. The court ruled that “[t]he government must propose a course
of treatment in which it specifies the particular drug to be administered,” and must
“explain how it reached its conclusions” regarding medical appropriateness “with respect
to Evans as an individual.” Id. at 240. Further, the government “must set forth the
particular medication, including the dose range, it proposes to administer to Evans to
restore his competency” and “must also relate the proposed treatment plan to the
individual defendant’s particular medical condition.” Id. at 242. Finally, the government
must spell out why it proposed the particular course of treatment, provide the
estimated time the proposed treatment plan will take to restore the defendant’s
competence and the criteria it will apply when deciding when to discontinue
the treatment, describe the plan’s probable benefits and side effect risks for the
defendant’s particular medical condition, show how it will deal with the plan’s
probable side effects, and explain why, in its view, the benefits of the treatment
plan outweigh the costs of its side effects.
Id. at 242 (footnote and citations omitted).
16. United States v. Evans, 427 F. Supp. 2d 696, 705 (W.D. Va. 2006).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 706.
19. United States v. Evans, 199 F. App’x 290, 290 (4th Cir. 2006).
20. The district court based its conclusion that the government has an “important”
interest in bringing Evans to trial on the fact that Evans “is charged with a felony for
which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years.” United States v. Evans, No.
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captures the inadequacy of the due process test for deciding when to
allow the government to administer involuntary medical treatment for
the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial. As cases
like Evans demonstrate, “medically appropriate” is an inadequate standard
for protecting an incompetent defendant’s interest in avoiding harms
from involuntary antipsychotic medications that are not justified by the
government’s interest in bringing him to trial.
Part I of this Article discusses the legal protections against involuntary
medical treatment. In the typical right to refuse treatment case, a patient’s
interests are divided—the patient’s interest in autonomous decisionmaking
about his health requires that he be allowed to refuse medical treatment,
but the patient’s interest in preserving his health, and perhaps even his
life, requires that he be administered involuntary treatment. Generally,
when a patient chooses to refuse treatment at the expense of his own life
or health, courts have ruled that the government’s interest in preserving
the patient’s life or health is insufficient to justify involuntary treatment.21
In a small subset of right to refuse treatment cases, however, the government
seeks to administer involuntary treatment for some purpose other than
preserving the patient’s life or health. Part II examines such cases,
including several Supreme Court cases decided under the Due Process
Clause and several decided under the Fourth Amendment. As Part III
explains, in following the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Due Process
Clause cases, trial courts have permitted the government to administer
involuntary antipsychotic medications that risk causing, and in some
cases have caused, harms that are at least as severe as harms that in the
Fourth Amendment cases prompted the Supreme Court to rule that
102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2004). The Fourth Circuit
agreed: “We think it beyond dispute that the Government does have an important interest
in trying a defendant charged with a felony carrying a maximum punishment of 10 years
imprisonment.” United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005). The
complexities of measuring the importance of the government’s interest in bringing a
defendant to trial are discussed infra notes 195–217 and accompanying text.
21. See John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for
Unwilling Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 881 (2006) (“Courts today are usually
vigilant to protect the right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment, even
lifesaving procedures.”); Andrea Marsh, Testing Pregnant Women and Newborns for
HIV: Legal and Ethical Responses to Public Health Efforts to Prevent Pediatric AIDS,
13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 247 (2001) (noting that “the Court has reaffirmed the
competent adult’s right to refuse life-preserving medical treatment, indicating that the
state’s interest in preserving life does not trump individual autonomy so long as the
individual’s wishes regarding treatment can be determined to a sufficient degree of
certainty” (footnote omitted)); Melvin I. Urofsky, Do Go Gentle into That Good Night:
Thoughts on Death, Suicide, Morality and the Law, 59 ARK. L. REV. 819, 824 (2007)
(“In the 1970s and 1980s, state courts reaffirmed the notion that a competent person,
voluntarily making a knowledgeable decision, had the legal right to refuse or terminate
treatment.”).
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involuntary medical treatment was not justified. Part IV analyzes the
government’s interest in rendering criminal defendants competent to
stand trial, proposing that a Fourth Amendment-like balancing test—
instead of the current due process medical appropriateness test—would
better ensure that courts decide to allow involuntary antipsychotic medications
only when the government’s interest in rendering a criminal defendant
competent to stand trial is important enough to justify the harms. The
Article concludes that under the current due process test, incompetent
criminal defendants are being subjected to harms that might not be
justified by the government’s interest in bringing them to trial.
I. LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST INVOLUNTARY MEDICAL TREATMENT
Historically, the primary legal source of protection for an individual’s
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was tort law, in particular the
law of battery.22 Not until late in the twentieth century did courts
recognize a constitutionally protected interest in refusing medical
treatment.23 One of the first cases to recognize this constitutional protection
was In re Quinlan, decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976.24
Twenty-one-year-old Karen Quinlan had been in a persistent vegetative
state for several months, breathing by means of a respirator with little
hope of recovery or improvement, when her family decided that she

22. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (“The constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition that was discussed in Cruzan was . . .
grounded in the Nation’s history and traditions, given the common-law rule that forced
medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment.” (citation omitted)); I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and
the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1155–56 (2008) (“The belief that an
individual is sovereign over his body . . . stands behind a number of familiar legal
doctrines like the right to be free from battery, the right to give informed consent, and the
right to refuse medical treatment.” (footnote omitted)).
23. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (noting that in Cruzan, the Court “assumed
that the Constitution granted competent persons a ‘constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.’” (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279)); Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997) (“Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled,
if competent, to refuse unwanted life saving treatment . . . .”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
24. See Kristen M. Dama, Redefining a Final Act: The Fourteenth Amendment and
States’ Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be Put to Death,
9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1083, 1099 (2007) (“In 1976, in In re Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court established a right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment; this was one of
the first, and most direct, affirmations of this right.” (footnote omitted)).
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would not have wanted to be kept alive under such circumstances.25
When Quinlan’s physician refused to disconnect her from the respirator,
her father petitioned the court for the right to do so.26 The state of New
Jersey argued that its interests in the preservation of life and in the
independent functioning of the medical profession justified continued
treatment.27 The court ruled that if her family, her doctor, and the
hospital ethics committee all agreed that she had no reasonable chance
of recovery, Quinlan’s life-sustaining treatment could be terminated.28
Although the court did reference the “very great” invasiveness of
Quinlan’s treatment—“24 hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, the
assistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding tube”29—the court did
not base its ruling on any physical harms that Quinlan might have
experienced because of continued treatment.30 Instead, the court decided
that continued treatment would harm Quinlan’s autonomy and privacy
interests.31 Quinlan had a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment,
but because of her medical condition, she could not assert that right
herself.32 Allowing someone else to refuse medical treatment for her
would “vindicate” her right of privacy,33 even though it would also cause
her physical harm.34

25. 348 A.2d 801, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (“Karen Quinlan is quoted
as saying she never wanted to be kept alive by extraordinary means. The statements
attributed to her by her mother, sister and a friend are indicated to have been made
essentially in relation to instances where close friends or relatives were terminally ill.”),
modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
26. Id.
27. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651–52, 663 (N.J. 1976).
28. Id. at 671–72.
29. Id. at 664.
30. Id. at 662–64. The parties disputed whether Quinlan was capable of
experiencing pain. See ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF
LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 147–48 (1979). Not disputed, though, was the fact
that discontinuing treatment would likely hasten Quinlan’s death. In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d at 655.
31. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (“The Court in Griswold found the unwritten
constitutional right of privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights . . . . Presumably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances . . . .” (citations omitted)).
32. Id. (“[I]f Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the
existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the lifesupport apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death.”).
33. Id. at 664 (“[Karen’s] right of privacy in respect of the matter before the Court
is to be vindicated by Mr. Quinlan as guardian, as hereinabove determined.”); see also
id. (“The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian
and family of Karen to render their best judgment, subject to the qualifications
hereinafter stated, as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.”).
34. Or more precisely, discontinuing medical treatment would allow Quinlan’s
illness to cause her physical harm. See supra note 30.
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The United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, similarly acknowledged a constitutionally protected
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.35 Like Karen Quinlan,
Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state kept alive by a feeding
tube when her parents decided that she would not have wanted to
continue receiving such treatment—treatment that would prolong her life
but would not offer any real hope of recovery.36 As in Quinlan, the Court in
Cruzan found that unwanted medical treatment would harm Cruzan not
physically but psychically; or as Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion
explained, such unwanted treatment “burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity,
and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.”37 Even
though Cruzan’s autonomy interest in refusing treatment could not be
exercised on her behalf without harming her physical health, the Court
ruled that the government’s interest in preserving Cruzan’s health could
not justify continued treatment that she would not want.38
Most right to refuse treatment cases are like Quinlan and Cruzan—
cases in which an individual’s interest in making an autonomous choice
to refuse medical treatment is at odds with the government’s interest in
preserving the individual’s life or health. In such cases, courts routinely
rule that the government’s interest does not justify abridging the individual’s
interest.39 What, though, of cases in which the government’s purpose for
seeking to administer involuntary medical treatment is not to preserve a
35. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions.”); see also id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
36. Id. at 266–68.
37. Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 280.
39. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986); see also Norman
L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of Death
and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 183–84 (2001) (“The cases acknowledge a
legitimate governmental interest in promoting sanctity of human life, but they also tend
to find that a patient’s liberty interests (self-determination and bodily integrity) simply
outweigh the state’s abstract interest in sanctity of life.”); Jaime Staples King &
Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Medical
Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 468 (2006) (noting “the primacy in the law
of an individual’s autonomy over her health and the ability of a competent individual to
make medical decisions that may not be in her best medical interest”).
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patient’s life or health? What kind of government interest can justify
involuntary medical treatment that not only compromises autonomous
decisionmaking but also causes physical harms?
II. JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In cases like Quinlan and Cruzan, the government’s interest that
involuntary treatment promotes is the life or health of the person who is
refusing treatment.40 Occasionally, though, the government seeks to
administer involuntary treatment not to preserve the treatment-refusing
person’s life or health but to achieve some other interest, such as protecting
the public from a smallpox epidemic, combating drunk driving, or
obtaining evidence of a crime.41 In these cases, it has come to matter
whether the government’s actions are recognized as a search or seizure
that implicates the Fourth Amendment or are instead characterized only
as an interference with autonomous decisionmaking that implicates the
Due Process Clause. Under the Fourth Amendment, involuntary treatment
must be reasonable, given the weight of the government’s interest that
the involuntary treatment advances. But under the Due Process Clause
generally, and in particular under the test recently set forth by the
Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, courts ask not whether involuntary
treatment is reasonable but rather whether it is medically appropriate.42
The path that led to Sell and the medical appropriateness standard
began with Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the first Supreme Court case to
rule on the constitutionality of administering involuntary medical
treatment for police power purposes.43 Between Jacobson and Sell, the
Court developed a due process jurisprudence that defines autonomous
decisionmaking as the individual constitutional interest that is infringed
by unjustified involuntary medical treatment. As a result, the Due Process
Clause permits government actions that interfere with autonomous
decisionmaking if those actions promote government interests that are
important enough to justify such interference.

40. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. 647, 651–52 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
41. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763–66 (1985) (evidence of a crime);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–72 (1966) (drunk driving and evidence of a
crime); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–28 (1905) (smallpox).
42. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177, 181 (2003); see also Riggins v.
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990).
43. 197 U.S. 11, 14–15 (1905).
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A. Police Powers and Autonomous Decisionmaking
The Supreme Court first considered the possibility that compelling
people to submit to unwanted medical procedures might be a valid
exercise of the government’s police powers in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.44
Henry Jacobson objected that a Massachusetts law requiring him to be
vaccinated against smallpox was an invasion of his “liberty,” was
“unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive,” and was “an assault upon his
person.”45 The Court rejected Jacobson’s arguments, ruling that when
faced with an impending smallpox epidemic, the state of Massachusetts
was justified in compelling its residents, including Jacobson, to be
vaccinated.46 The Court seemed to view Jacobson as something of a
free-rider—someone who wanted to enjoy the benefits of a safe, healthy
community but who was not willing to accept the responsibility of
following the community’s health and safety regulations: “We are not
prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in any city or
town where smallpox is prevalent . . . may thus defy the will of its
constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legislative
sanction of the State.”47
Although the Court upheld Massachusetts’s law and its application to
Jacobson, it also suggested that there are limits not only on the
individual’s right to refuse to be vaccinated but also on the government’s
right to compel such treatment.48 The Jacobson Court thus did not endorse
compulsory vaccinations, even if justified by an impending epidemic,
irrespective of the amount of physical harm the vaccination would cause.
Instead, the Court imposed an upper limit on the amount of harm that the
government could cause, writing that if “a particular condition of [a
person’s] health or body” would make vaccination “cruel and inhuman
in the last degree,” a court should intervene to “protect the health and
life of the individual concerned.”49
44. Id.
45. Id. at 26.
46. Id. at 38–39.
47. Id. at 37.
48. Id. at 38–39.
49. Id. Jacobson is in one sense about the individual’s right to refuse medical
treatment but it is also in another sense about the government’s options when confronted
with an emergency. In emergency situations, the government is justified in using
appropriate force even if it causes serious physical harm. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (allowing use of deadly force to end a prison riot); Tennessee
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When Jacobson was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet defined
substantive due process in terms of personal autonomy.50 Then, the
substantive liberty that the Due Process Clause protected was primarily
economic.51 But the Supreme Court’s current substantive due process
jurisprudence protects not so much individual economic liberty as individual
“privacy,” “dignity,” and “autonomy.”52 In its modern substantive due
process cases, the Court has identified the individual liberty interest
that is at stake as the interest in making autonomous decisions. 53 The
government satisfies its due process obligations by not interfering in
individual decisions and violates due process by imposing an “undue
burden” on individual decisions.54 A due process injury either occurs or
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (allowing use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing
felon if “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm”).
50. See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 296 n.82 (2007) (“Jacobson
was a Lochner-era case. The doctrine of substantive due process was of course liberally
applied in the Lochner era but largely to strike down laws on the grounds that they
interfered with economic rights, not fundamental personal rights.”).
51. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742 (1989)
(“From the late 1870’s to the turn of the century, the Court formulated an interpretation
of due process in which the predominant figure was a fundamental, potentially inviolate
‘liberty of contract’ with which legislatures had no power to interfere.”).
52. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (ruling that the “right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause” encompasses “the personal and private life of the
individual”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
772 (1986) (protecting right to make decision that is “basic to individual dignity and
autonomy”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing a “right of privacy”
that is “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty”); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (referring to the “zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
53. Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, a companion case to
Roe v. Wade, identifies three categories of decisions that the Due Process Clause
protects:
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of one’s
intellect, interests, tastes, and personality. . . . Second is freedom of choice in
the basic decisions of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation,
contraception, and the education and upbringing of children. . . . Third is the
freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or
compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211–13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court made this understanding
of due process clear:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
54. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79 (developing “undue burden” test); see also
Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45

172

KLEIN.UPDATEDPRINTER

[VOL. 46: 161, 2009]

3/12/2009 10:14:37 AM

Involuntary Medications
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

does not occur at the moment the government prevents an individual
from making an autonomous decision.55 A violation of due process does
not require that the individual experience any additional harms as a result
of the government’s interference with autonomous decisionmaking.56
Thus, if the government lacks sufficient justification for overriding an
individual’s decision to refuse medical treatment, then the person who
has been physically harmed by involuntary medical treatment has experienced
exactly the same due process injury—unjustified interference with the
right to make autonomous decisions—as has the person who has not
been physically harmed, or who has even been physically benefited, by
involuntary medical treatment.
UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1079 (1998) (stating that “privacy is the quintessential negative
right—a right to be free from governmental interference”); Rubenfeld, supra note 51, at
784 (“The principle of the right to privacy . . . is the fundamental freedom not to have
one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state.”). Some
scholars, though, have argued for a more expansive, positive-right understanding of the
right to privacy. See, e.g., April L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women and Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 723, 751 (2004) (“If understood as decisional autonomy, then the notion of
privacy expands to include an affirmative state obligation to ensure that women,
regardless of whether they are pregnant, get to make decisions regarding health care
autonomously, not without context, but without familial or state coercion.”); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1478 (1991) (“The definition of privacy as a
purely negative right serves to exempt the state from any obligation to ensure the social
conditions and resources necessary for self-determination and autonomous decisionmaking.”).
55. Cf. Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D. Mass. 2001)
(“Intangible rights . . . are abridged the moment a state silences free speech or prevents a
citizen from following the precepts of his religion. While the violation may be
accompanied by psychological or even physical injury, the severity of incursion is not
necessarily measured in those terms.”).
56. A violation of the autonomy interest protected by the Due Process Clause
necessarily causes not a physical harm but a kind of psychological, spiritual,
metaphysical, or otherwise intangible, nonphysical harm—the harm of not being able to
make an autonomous decision. See id. (“[T]he harms proscribed by the First
Amendment, Due Process, or Equal Protection are assaults on individual freedom and
personal liberty, even on spiritual autonomy, and not on physical well-being.”). Thus,
the Due Process Clause protects against the nonphysical harms that result from
unjustified interference with an individual’s right to autonomously decide to refuse
medical treatment. The Due Process Clause does not, however, necessarily protect
against any physical harms caused by involuntary medical treatment. This does not
mean that violations of the Due Process Clause cannot cause physical harms. Rather, it
means only that a government action that has violated due process has not necessarily
caused a physical injury. Cf. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that “[a] prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First
Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have
sustained”).
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Whatever else is desirable or undesirable about this understanding of
substantive due process, it inadequately protects an incompetent criminal
defendant’s interest in avoiding unreasonable harms when the government
seeks to administer involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of
bringing the defendant to trial. The Supreme Court has ruled that in
these cases, antipsychotic medications must be “medically appropriate.”57
By explicitly requiring that involuntary medications be medically appropriate,
the Court would seem to be suggesting that trial courts might in some
cases refuse to authorize involuntary antipsychotic medications on the
basis of medical inappropriateness. But as originally conceived by the
Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper, the medical appropriateness
standard was not intended to serve as a check on unjustified administration
of involuntary antipsychotic medications.58 And even though in Sell the
Court might have intended medical appropriateness to be a check, in
practice it has not served this purpose.
B. The Due Process Clause and Medical Appropriateness
Washington v. Harper was the Supreme Court’s first involuntary
antipsychotic medication case.59 The Court observed that Walter Harper, a
prison inmate, “possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”60 The Court rejected, though,
Harper’s argument that the Due Process Clause prevented the state from
administering involuntary medication to him unless he had been found
incompetent to make his own medical treatment decisions.61 Much of
the Court’s reasoning rests on Harper’s status as a prisoner62 and the

57. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (requiring that “the court must
conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate” (emphasis omitted));
see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (“medically appropriate”);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (“in the inmate’s medical interest”).
58. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
59. 494 U.S. 210, 215–16 (1990).
60. Id. at 221–22.
61. Id. Generally, incompetence to make medical treatment decisions is a requirement
of involuntary medication administered under the government’s parens patriae powers
but not its police powers. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[T]he
sine qua non for the state’s use of its parens patriae power as justification for the
forceful administration of mind-affecting drugs is a determination that the individual to
whom the drugs are to be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself whether
he should take the drugs.”).
62. E.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 (“The extent of a prisoner’s right under the
Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in
the context of the inmate’s confinement.”).

174

KLEIN.UPDATEDPRINTER

[VOL. 46: 161, 2009]

3/12/2009 10:14:37 AM

Involuntary Medications
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

duties of the prison administrators.63 Although the Court did acknowledge
the potential of antipsychotic medications to cause physically harmful
side effects,64 its analysis balanced Harper’s liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medications—whether physically harmful or not—against the
state’s interest in safely maintained prisons.65 The interest in safely
maintained prisons prevailed.66 The Court held that “given the requirements
of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the state to
treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic
drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”67
The Supreme Court did not intend for this “in the inmate’s medical
interest” requirement to limit the government’s ability to administer
involuntary antipsychotic medications. Instead, the Court included this
requirement to address concerns raised in a dissenting opinion that
different, more rigorous procedural requirements were needed to ensure
that prison psychiatrists would not administer involuntary antipsychotic
medications solely for institutional convenience—that is, to control the
behavior of prisoners rather than to treat their mental illnesses.68 The
majority concluded, though, that such procedural protections were
unnecessary.69 Thus, in Harper, the medical appropriateness requirement

63. E.g., id. at 225 (“Prison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring the
safety of prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also the duty to take reasonable
measures for the prisoners’ own safety.” (citation omitted)).
64. Id. at 229–30.
65. Id. at 236 (finding that Washington’s policy “is an accommodation between an
inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and
the State’s interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that
an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others”).
66. Id. at 225 (“There are few cases in which the State’s interest in combating the
danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison
environment, which, by definition, is made up of persons with a demonstrated proclivity
for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. Id. at 227.
68. Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state’s policy allows
“forced psychotropic medication on the basis of purely institutional concerns”).
69. Id. at 233. The Court explained:
There is no indication that any institutional biases affected or altered the
decision to medicate respondent against his will . . . . In the absence of record
evidence to the contrary, we are not willing to presume that members of the
staff lack the necessary independence to provide an inmate with a full and fair
hearing in accordance with the Policy.
Id.
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simply reflects the Court’s belief that prison psychiatrists can be trusted
to prescribe only those treatments that are medically appropriate.70
Riggins v. Nevada is the Court’s only other pre-Sell case to address the
administration of involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of
advancing the government’s interest in criminal prosecutions.71 In
Riggins, the Court considered David Riggins’s argument that the state
had unjustifiably compelled him to take antipsychotic medications
during his first-degree murder trial.72 Unlike Harper, Riggins involved a
criminal defendant rather than a convicted prisoner,73 and the state’s
purpose for administering involuntary antipsychotic medications had
nothing to do with prison safety.74 Nevertheless, the Court both began
and ended its analysis of Riggins’s claim with Harper:75 “Under Harper,
forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent
a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical

70. Id. at 231 (“[W]e conclude that an inmate’s interests are adequately protected,
and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical
professionals rather than a judge.”); id. at 233 (“The risks associated with antipsychotic
drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical professionals.”). The
problem, though, is that while medical professionals might well be better than judges at
assessing the medical risks of involuntary treatment, medical professionals are not better
at deciding whether the government’s interest that the involuntary treatment advances is
important enough to justify the medical risks. See David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization,
Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 910 (1975)
(“The medical disciplines can no more judge the legitimacy of state intervention into the
lives of disturbed or disturbing individuals than a prosecutor can judge the guilt of a
person he has accused.”).
71. 504 U.S. 127, 133–38 (1992).
72. Id. at 133.
73. Courts apply a highly deferential standard of scrutiny to government actions
that infringe upon prisoners’ constitutional rights. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987) (ruling that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”).
Although prisoners do not lose all constitutional rights as a result of their convictions,
they retain only those constitutional protections that are not “incompatible with the
objectives of incarceration.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); Hanna v.
Toner, 630 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1980) (“Prisoners do not lose all of their constitutional
rights when they enter a penal institution. Rather they retain all of their constitutional
rights except for those which must be impinged upon for security or rehabilitative
purposes.”).
74. In Riggins, the Court assumed that the state’s purpose for administering
involuntary antipsychotic medications was to maintain Riggins’s competence to stand
trial. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136 (hypothesizing that the trial court “simply weighed
the risk that the defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’[s] outward
appearance against the chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off
Mellaril, and struck the balance in favor of involuntary medication”).
75. Id. at 133 (“Our discussion in Washington v. Harper provides useful
background for evaluating this claim.” (citation omitted)).
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appropriateness. The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much
protection to persons the State detains for trial.”76
As in Harper, the Riggins Court acknowledged that antipsychotic
medications can cause physically harmful side effects.77 These physically
harmful side effects make involuntary medications’ interference with
individual liberty “particularly severe.”78 But in considering whether the
state’s interest in bringing Riggins to trial justified involuntary
medications, there was no assessment of the physical harms that Riggins
himself might have experienced.79 The harmfulness of antipsychotics is
in effect already written into the Harper and Riggins due process test—a
test that is substantially the same as the Sell test.80
In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court set forth a four-factor test
for determining when the government may administer involuntary
76. Id. at 135. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, recognized the
inappropriateness of relying on Harper: “This is not a case like Washington v. Harper, in
which the purpose of the involuntary medication was to ensure that the incarcerated
person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others.” Id. at 140 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). The dissenting justices, Thomas and
Scalia, also noted that the Court was inappropriately relying on Harper:
This case differs from Harper because it involves a pretrial detainee and not a
convicted prisoner. The standards for forcibly medicating inmates well may
differ from those for persons awaiting trial. The Court, however, does not rely
on this distinction in departing from Harper; instead, it purports to be applying
Harper to detainees.
Id. at 157 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 133–34.
78. Id. at 134.
79. Id. at 134–35. The Court did note that the medication might have made
Riggins drowsy or confused, but these side effects were important not because they
might have been physically harmful but because they might have interfered with
Riggins’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. See id. at 137 (“It is clearly possible that
such side effects had an impact upon not just Riggins’ outward appearance, but also the
content of his testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the
proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel.”); see also id. at 142
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the defendant takes the stand, as Riggins
did, his demeanor can have a great bearing on his credibility and persuasiveness, and on
the degree to which he evokes sympathy.”).
80. The Sell Court explicitly relied on both Harper and Riggins:
These two cases, Harper and Riggins, indicate that the Constitution permits the
Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill
defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of
the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly
to further important governmental trial-related interests.
539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
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medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial.81 This test allows involuntary medications when (1) “important”
government interests are at stake, (2) medication will “significantly
further” those important government interests, (3) involuntary medication is
“necessary to further” those interests, and (4) medication is “medically
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his
medical condition.”82
Thus, under Harper, Riggins, and Sell, involuntary medications are
permitted so long as they are justified by an “important” government
interest, are properly tailored to advance that interest,83 and are “medically
appropriate.”84 Under the Fourth Amendment, however, involuntary
medical treatment must be more than medically appropriate; it must also
not be unreasonably harmful.
C. The Fourth Amendment and Reasonableness
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people “to be secure in
their persons.”85 And the Fourth Amendment guarantees, especially, the
right of people suspected by the government of having committed a
crime to be secure in their persons.86 Although the prototypical Fourth
Amendment case involves a search or seizure for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of a crime, the Supreme Court has often broadly
described the function of the Fourth Amendment as protecting
individuals against unjustified government intrusions upon their privacy
and personal security.87 And administering involuntary antipsychotic
81. Id. at 180–81.
82. Id. (emphases omitted).
83. Tailoring is unlikely to serve as a check against unjustified administration of
involuntary antipsychotic medications because antipsychotic medications are the
intervention most likely to render a defendant with schizophrenia, or another psychotic
disorder, competent to stand trial. See infra note 114.
84. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179–82 (following Harper and Riggins).
85. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
86. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820, 820 (1994) (noting that “the Fourth Amendment structures the investigative
process by restricting many of the most effective means of detecting law-breaking and
apprehending law-breakers”).
87. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (“The Fourth
Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary
and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal
security of individuals.”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic
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medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial is a potentially unjustified intrusion by the government upon the
defendant’s privacy and personal security.88 Thus, the Fourth Amendment
cases involving involuntary medical treatment provide useful insights
into how courts should decide whether to allow the government to
administer involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent criminal
defendants.
The two seminal cases in which the Supreme Court considered
whether the Fourth Amendment permits involuntary medical treatment
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime are Schmerber v.
California and Winston v. Lee.89 In Schmerber, the Court ruled that
compelling Armando Schmerber, whom the police suspected of having
driven under the influence of alcohol, to submit to a blood test did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.90 The Court noted that blood tests are “a
commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations” and also
that “for most people the procedure involves no risk, trauma, or pain.”91
Moreover, such tests are both “highly effective” in determining whether
an individual is intoxicated92 as well as necessary for achieving the
public health goal of diminishing drunk driving.93 The Court was careful to

purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court,
is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
88. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (“The forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with
that person’s liberty.”); see also id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of
permanent injury . . . .”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (“In the case of
antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril, that interference is particularly severe . . . .”).
89. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
90. 384 U.S. at 771.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 763 (explaining that “given the difficulty of proving
drunkenness by other means, . . . results of the blood test were of vital importance if the
State were to enforce its drunken driving laws”); see also William G. Ross,
Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure—Court-Ordered Surgical Removal of a Bullet
from an Unconsenting Defendant for Evidentiary Purposes Held Reasonable Under the
Fourth Amendment, 55 TEX. L. REV. 147, 157 (1977) (noting “[t]he direct deterrent
relationship between blood tests and a reduction in drunken driving”).
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state that its decision was limited to approving the minor intrusion of a
blood test and was not a license allowing more substantial intrusions.94
In Winston v. Lee, the Court demonstrated that it meant what it had
said in Schmerber about not authorizing more substantial intrusions.95
Rudolph Lee was charged with attempted robbery and malicious
wounding; the state alleged that Lee and his intended victim, Ralph
Watkinson, had exchanged gunshots, with a bullet from Watkinson’s
gun ending up lodged in Lee’s chest.96 The government wanted to compel
Lee to undergo surgery so that the bullet could be removed and tested to
prove Lee’s identity as the person who attempted to rob Watkinson.97
The potential harmfulness of the surgery to Lee was uncertain, seemingly
because doctors were unsure about how difficult it would be to locate the
bullet.98 The surgery might but might not have required “extensive
probing and retracting of the muscle tissue,” which might but might not
have caused tissue damage and infection.99 The Supreme Court did not
allow the government to compel this surgery, in part because of the
uncertainty about its harmfulness,100 in part because any involuntary
surgery is a substantial intrusion,101 and in part because the government
did not have a compelling need to recover the bullet.102
94. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“That we today hold that
the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual’s body
under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”). Not all of the Justices shared the
majority’s assessment of a blood test as a minor intrusion. Justice Fortas called the
blood test “an act of violence.” Id. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas called
it “forcible bloodletting.” Id. at 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95. 470 U.S. at 755.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 764.
99. Id. The appellate court summarized the risks:
[O]ne surgeon testified that the procedure, excluding the anesthesia, would
take only 15–20 minutes; another surgeon predicted the procedure could take
up to 2 1/2 hours to complete. An expert testified that there was virtually no
risk of muscle or tissue damage; another stated that these problems were
possibilities. Several doctors testified that the procedure would be considered
“minor surgery”; another doctor claimed that there was no such thing as minor
surgery.
Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983).
100. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (“The medical risks of the operation,
although apparently not extremely severe, are a subject of considerable dispute; the very
uncertainty militates against finding the operation to be ‘reasonable.’”); id. at 764 (“The
court properly took the resulting uncertainty about the medical risks into account.”).
101. Id. at 759 (“A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude
that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”).
102. Id. at 765 (“[A]lthough we recognize the difficulty of making determinations
in advance as to the strength of the case against respondent, petitioners’ assertions of a
compelling need for the bullet are hardly persuasive.”).
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These Fourth Amendment cases take a better approach than does Sell
to deciding whether to allow involuntary medical treatment. The Fourth
Amendment approach balances the likelihood and the severity of any
physical harms that the defendant might experience as a result of the
involuntary treatment against the government’s interest that the treatment
promotes. The blood test in Schmerber was reasonable because it posed
virtually no risk of any physical harm and was “highly effective” in
identifying drunk drivers,103 while the surgery in Winston was unreasonable
because it posed an uncertain risk of possibly serious physical harm and
was not essential to the government’s case against the defendant.104 The
due process approach to deciding whether to allow involuntary medications—
the Sell approach—is inadequate because it is not so much a balancing
test as a categorical or threshold test. It does not ask courts to weigh the
potential harms that an incompetent criminal defendant is likely to
experience as a result of the medications against the government’s interest
in bringing that defendant to trial. Instead, Sell asks courts to decide whether
the government has an “important” interest and also to decide, but as
a separate inquiry, whether involuntary antipsychotics are “medically
appropriate.”105
III. INCOMPETENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND INVOLUNTARY
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS
A. Schizophrenia and Incompetence to Stand Trial
Schizophrenia is widely considered to be among the most serious of
mental illnesses.106 Its overarching impairment is a loss of contact with
reality, including such symptoms as delusions, or beliefs not based in

103.
104.
105.
106.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
Winston, 470 U.S. at 755.
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing Sell test).
See Steven M. Paul, Introduction: The New Pharmacotherapy of Schizophrenia, in
CURRENT ISSUES IN THE PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA xvii (Alan Breier et al.
eds., 2001) (referring to schizophrenia as “arguably the most severe and disabling of the
major psychiatric disorders”). According to the American Psychiatric Association, “[t]he
characteristic symptoms of Schizophrenia involve a range of cognitive and emotional
dysfunctions that include perception, inferential thinking, language and communication,
behavioral monitoring, affect, fluency and productivity of thought and speech, hedonic
capacity, volition and drive, and attention.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 299 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter
DSM-IV-TR].
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reality, and hallucinations, or perceptual experiences not based in
reality.107
Some defendants with schizophrenia, or a related psychotic disorder,
have delusional beliefs that preclude their ability to understand the trial
process or to assist their attorneys and that therefore make them incompetent
to stand trial.108 For example, defendants with schizophrenia have been
found incompetent to stand trial because they have delusional beliefs
either about the facts of the crime—such as a defendant’s belief that “he
had not in fact murdered his mother, as he had used only rubber
bullets”109 or that “people who are killed are not really dead”110—or
about the judicial process—such as a defendant’s belief that he was
being “persecuted by ‘right wingers’ and the government”111 or that “the
police are trying to get him to ‘the court of lords.’”112 Although treatment
recommendations for schizophrenia include not only antipsychotic
medications but also psychosocial therapies,113 it is treatment with
medications that is most likely to alleviate the acute symptoms of
psychosis.114
107. See GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 284–85
(8th ed. 2001) (defining delusions as “beliefs held contrary to reality” and hallucinations
as “sensory experiences in the absence of any stimulation from the environment”).
108. To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must possess both “sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (quoting Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000) (instructing trial
courts to hold competency hearings if “there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense”). The
competence requirement protects the defendant’s right to a fair trial:
Unless a defendant is competent, the State cannot put him on trial.
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of
those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective
assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine
witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent
without penalty for doing so.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
109. Amador v. State, 712 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
110. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
111. United States v. Evans, No. 102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *1 (W.D. Va.
Mar. 18, 2004), vacated and remanded, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005).
112. Commonwealth v. Crowley, 471 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Mass. 1984).
113. See Anthony F. Lehman et al., The Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research
Team (PORT): Updated Treatment Recommendations 2003, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 193,
201 (2004) (“For most persons with schizophrenia, the combination of psychopharmacologic
and psychosocial interventions improves outcomes.”).
114. See John M. Kane, Conventional Neuroleptic Treatment: Current Status,
Future Role, in THE NEW PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 89, 90 (Alan Breier
ed., 1996) (describing antipsychotic medications as “the primary modality in the
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B. Antipsychotic Medications 101
For many people with schizophrenia, antipsychotic medications are
lifesaving, literally as well as figuratively.115 But even when taken
voluntarily, these medications are not without significant problems,
including the likelihood of serious side effects.116 A large part of the
difficulty in treating schizophrenia is finding an antipsychotic medication
treatment of an acute episode or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness”);
Thomas H. McGlashon, Rationale and Parameters for Medication-Free Research in
Psychosis, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 300, 301 (2006) (noting that antipsychotic medications
are “the most rapid, effective, and economical treatment for active psychosis”).
115. As one schizophrenia researcher explains:
Active psychosis is a dangerous, life-threatening state. Behavior is often
unpredictable because of misperceptions, misconceptions, and irrational
thinking. The gravest dangers are suicide, homicide, and physical injury. Almost
as important are paralyses of judgment and empathy resulting in violations of
social convention and trust and leading ultimately to social isolation and
stigmatization. For persons in this state of mind, antipsychotic medications are
unquestionably a powerful therapeutic tool.
McGlashon, supra note 114, at 300.
Before the development of antipsychotics, schizophrenia was essentially untreatable,
and the back wards of state hospitals were filled with people who had little to no chance
of ever leaving:
Prior to 1950, effective drugs for treating psychotic patients were virtually
nonexistent, and psychotic patients were usually permanently or semipermanently
hospitalized; by 1955, more than half a million psychotic persons in the United
States were residing in mental hospitals. In 1956, a dramatic and steady reversal in
this trend began. By 1983, fewer than 220,000 were institutionalized. This
decline occurred despite a doubling in the numbers of admissions to state hospitals.
By the early 1990s, people with schizophrenia were routinely stabilized on
medication and discharged from institutions quite rapidly. What accounted for
this dramatic shift was a class of drugs called the phenothiazines.
ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE
ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 346–47 (10th ed. 2005)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted).
116. According to the American Psychiatric Association:
Side effects of medications are a crucial aspect of treatment because they often
determine medication choice and are a primary reason for medication
discontinuation. Side effects can complicate and undermine antipsychotic
treatment in various ways. The side effects themselves may cause or worsen
symptoms associated with schizophrenia, including negative, positive, and
cognitive symptoms and agitation. In addition, these side effects may contribute to
risk for other medical disorders. Finally, these side effects often are subjectively
difficult to tolerate and may affect the patient’s quality of life and willingness
to take the medication.
AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH
SCHIZOPHRENIA 66–67 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter APA PRACTICE GUIDELINES].
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that does not cause intolerable side effects.117 The American Psychiatric
Association defines a “recommended dose” of antipsychotic medication
as “that which is both effective and not likely to cause side effects that
are subjectively difficult to tolerate.”118
There are two categories of antipsychotic medications, each with its
own set of risks. The first category, called first-generation antipsychotics,
typical antipsychotics, or neuroleptics,119 has as its most serious risk
neurological syndromes such as tardive dyskinesia,120 while the second
category, called second-generation or atypical antipsychotics, is more
likely to cause metabolic disorders such as diabetes.121
1. Side Effects of First-Generation Antipsychotics
The first generation of antipsychotic medications was developed in the
1950s, and these drugs are believed to alleviate psychotic symptoms
primarily by blocking the activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine in
certain areas of the brain.122 This dopamine-blocking effect can also
lead to neurological disorders.123 Perhaps the most serious neurological
disorder that typical antipsychotics cause is tardive dyskinesia, which is
characterized by involuntary, irregular movements.124 Common symptoms

117. One recent study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of various
antipsychotic medications in treating people with chronic schizophrenia reported that of
nearly 1500 subjects, between sixty-four and eighty-two percent discontinued treatment
during the first phase of the study. Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic
Drugs in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1215
(2005). The study’s authors attributed the high rate of treatment discontinuation to
“intolerable side effects.” Id. at 1218 (“There were no significant differences among the
drugs in the time until discontinuation of treatment owing to intolerable side effects.”).
118. APA PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 116, at 11.
119. These drugs are called “neuroleptics” because they cause disorders with the
same symptoms as neurological diseases. See DAVISON & NEALE, supra note 107, at
305; JULIEN, supra note 115, at 345 n.1.
120. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing side effects of first-generation antipsychotic
medications).
121. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing side effects of second-generation antipsychotic
medications).
122. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 340 (“Early scientific evidence favored a pure
dopamine theory of schizophrenia: the disorder arises from dysregulation in certain brain
regions of the dopamine system, resulting in a relative surplus of dopamine in the brain.
Antipsychotic drugs therefore work by blocking dopamine receptors, an action that
qualifies them as dopamine receptor antagonists.” (citation and emphases omitted)).
123. Parkinson’s disease, for example, is caused by the death of dopamine-producing
cells in the motor area of the brain. Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke,
NINDS Parkinson’s Disease Information Page (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www. ninds.nih.gov/
disorders/parkinsons_disease/parkinsons_disease.htm (“Parkinson’s disease (PD) belongs
to a group of conditions called motor system disorders, which are the result of the loss of
dopamine-producing brain cells.”).
124. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 353.
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include tongue twisting and lip smacking as well as hyperkinetic
movements of the arms, legs, and trunk.125 Tardive dyskinesia is not
curable, and the standard treatment recommendation—discontinuation of
antipsychotic medications—amounts to exchanging the symptoms of
one horrific, incurable disorder for another.126 Once tardive dyskinesia
develops, the patient’s choices are to treat the psychosis and endure the
tardive dyskinesia or to treat the tardive dyskinesia and endure the
psychosis.127
Two other very disabling neurological disorders that the typical
antipsychotics can cause are dystonia and akathisia.128 Dystonia is
characterized by sustained muscle spasms that produce involuntary
movements and abnormal postures.129 Akathisia is characterized by
feelings of restlessness and anxiety.130 At its most severe, the experience
of akathisia is so distressing that some people become suicidal.131
In addition to these neurological side effects, the first-generation
antipsychotic medications can also cause a long list of other kinds of side
effects, including sedation, impaired cognitive functioning, autonomic
effects such as blurred vision and reduced blood pressure, and a rare but
potentially fatal reaction, neuroleptic malignant syndrome.132

125. Id.
126. Id. (noting that tardive dyskinesia is “often irreversible”).
127. See Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Tardive
Dyskinesia Information Page (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tardive
/tardive.htm (“There is no standard treatment for tardive dyskinesia. Treatment is highly
individualized. The first step is generally to stop or minimize the use of the neuroleptic
drug. However, for patients with a severe underlying condition this may not be a
feasible option.”).
128. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 352.
129. Id.
130. Id. (“Akathesia [is] a syndrome of the subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied
by restlessness, pacing, constant rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, purposeless
actions.”).
131. E. Cem Atbaglu et al., The Relationship of Akathisia with Suicidality and
Depersonalization Among Patients with Schizophrenia, 13 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY &
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 336, 336 (2001) (“Akathisia, characterized by a state of
subjective and motor restlessness, is a common and unpleasant side effect of
antipsychotic medication. Case reports have described both suicidality and violence as
being precipitated by this distressing condition.” (footnotes omitted)).
132. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 354–55.
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2. Side Effects of Second-Generation Antipsychotics
In the 1990s, researchers developed a new generation of antipsychotic
medications that are believed to alleviate psychotic symptoms by altering
the activity of dopamine and an additional neurotransmitter, usually
serotonin.133 These drugs were initially praised as “wonder drugs,” capable
of treating people who had not responded to other, typical medications
yet not likely to produce any of the neurological side effects commonly
observed with the older antipsychotics—hence the term “atypical.”134
Both of these early assessments have proven to have been overly
optimistic. Atypicals do work when other drugs have not, but some
people still are unresponsive even to these newer medications.135
Moreover, whereas atypicals were initially thought not to cause the same
neurological disorders as the typical antipsychotics, more recent data
suggests that the difference is in the dosage—that atypicals, if
administered in doses comparable to the typical antipsychotics, produce
similar levels of neurological side effects.136 And like the traditional
antipsychotics, the atypicals also cause a long list of other side effects,
ranging in seriousness from life-threatening—agranulocytosis (a loss of
white blood cells) and myocarditis (inflammation of the heart muscle)
are two potentially fatal side effects of Clozaril,137 the most risky but in

133. Id. at 341–42 (“There is no consensus concerning the biological mechanisms
that might impart and define an atypical antipsychotic. Atypical antipsychotics display
more than one mechanism for achieving atypicality. Almost all of these drugs are
antagonists at dopamine-2 receptors and have a second action, usually antagonism of the
serotonin 5-HT2 receptors.” (citations omitted)).
134. See id. at 346, 360–61.
135. Id. at 360 (estimating that between thirty and sixty percent of people who were
unresponsive to other drugs improved on Clozaril, one of the first atypical
antipsychotics). Some recent research suggests that, in general, atypical antipsychotics
are no more effective than the typical medications. See Shôn Lewis & Jeffrey
Lieberman, CATIE and CUtLASS: Can We Handle the Truth?, 192 BRITISH J.
PSYCHIATRY 161, 161–63 (2008).
136. Shitij Kapur et al., Relationship Between rDopamine D2 Occupancy, Clinical
Response, and Side Effects: A Double-Blind PET Study of First-Episode Schizophrenia,
157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 514, 517 (2000); Lieberman et al., supra note 117, at 1218
(suggesting that administering high doses of first generation antipsychotics “may have
biased previous comparisons of first- and second-generation drugs”).
137. See Jose Ma. J. Alvir et al., Clozapine Induced Agranulocytosis: Incidence and
Risk Factors in the United States, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 162, 162–67 (1993) (reporting
incidence and fatality rate from agranulocytosis in patients treated with Clozaril); J.G.
Kilian et al., Myocarditis and Cardiomyopathy Associated with Clozapine, 354 LANCET
1841, 1841 (1999) (“Clozapine therapy may be associated with potentially fatal myocarditis
and cardiomyopathy in physically healthy young adults with schizophrenia.”).
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many cases the most effective atypical antipsychotic138—to fairly minor,
including dry mouth, headaches, and insomnia.139
Although life-threatening side effects are rare, the second-generation
antipsychotics commonly cause metabolic disorders such as obesity and
hyperglycemia.140 Perhaps because these disorders are not uncommon
among the general population, courts in some cases seem rather unconcerned
about these side effects. The court in United States v. Archuleta, for example,
appears to be as indifferent as the court in Evans141 to the effect that
involuntary antipsychotic medications will have on Archuleta’s diabetes:
“Any health side effects, such as aggravation of diabetes, are medically
treatable and such treatments are commonplace and successful in this
area of medical practice.”142 In United States v. Weston, the court allowed
the government to continue administering involuntary antipsychotic
medications despite Weston’s physician’s testimony that the medications
were responsible for Weston’s seventy-pound weight gain.143 The court
confessed that it was “troubled by the defendant’s weight gain on the

138. See Robert W. Buckman & Randy D. Malan, Clozapine for Refractory
Schizophrenia: The Illinois Experience, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (SUPPLEMENT 1) 18,
18 (1999) (noting that Clozaril “has become the gold standard for treating drug-resistant
patients”); Juan R. Bustillo et al., The Psychosocial Treatment of Schizophrenia: An
Update, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 163, 173 (2001) (noting that “[s]uperiority for previously
resistant psychotic symptoms has been demonstrated only for clozapine”).
139. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 364 (listing insomnia and headache as common side
effects of Risperdal); id. at 366 (listing dry mouth as a side effect of Zyprexa).
140. “The safety advantages of the atypical drugs have been questioned because of
their propensity to induce weight gain and alter glucose and lipid metabolism.”
Lieberman et al., supra note 117, at 1210; see also JULIEN, supra note 115, at 369–72.
141. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Evans case).
142. United States v. Archuleta, No. 2:05CR0676 TC, 2006 WL 2476070, at *4 (D.
Utah, Aug. 24, 2006), aff’d, 218 F. App’x 754 (10th Cir. 2007).
143. According to the district court that monitored Weston’s progress while he was
being administered involuntary antipsychotics:
On June 20, 2004, Mr. Weston’s weight was recorded at 317 pounds. The
defendant has gained 70 pounds since he was initially placed at Butner. A
general practitioner brought in to evaluate Mr. Weston described him as
“morbidly obese.” With regard to this issue, Dr. Johnson has testified that “the
principal contributor in his weight gain is clearly his medication use. There is no
doubt about that. It is associated with significant weight gain.”
United States v. Weston, 326 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2004) (2004 progress
hearing) (citations omitted).
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anti-psychotic medications”144 but nevertheless found that the medications’
“continued use remains medically appropriate.”145
Despite the sanguine attitudes of these courts toward defendants who
have become morbidly obese or who are well on their way to developing
insulin-dependent diabetes, neither of these conditions is insignificant.
Both cause a wide range of long-term, exceedingly harmful, potentially
fatal complications, some of which can be difficult if not impossible to
treat fully.
a. Obesity
This disease presently is the topic of several conversations among
legal scholars; all of these conversations reflect the recognition that
obesity is a serious, life-threatening illness. First, some courts have
decided that morbid obesity can be grounds for removing a child from
his or her parents’ care.146 These decisions—rightly, most commentators
seem to believe—place obesity in the same category as other, more
traditional forms of child abuse.147 Second, tort theory has been widely
discussed as a possible basis for suing manufacturers whose products
might cause obesity.148 And finally, government taxation and other
144. Id. at 68.
145. Id. After more than two years of involuntary treatment with antipsychotic
medications, however, Weston remained too delusional to be brought to trial. In 2004,
the government conceded that further involuntary treatment was unlikely to render
Weston competent. United States v. Weston, No. 98-357 (EGS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23579, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2004).
146. See Shireen Arani, Case Comment, State Intervention in Cases of ObesityRelated Medical Neglect, 82 B.U. L. REV. 875, 875–76 (2002) (discussing the case of an
obese three-year-old child removed from her parents’ custody because they refused to
follow medical advice regarding her diet); Laura A. Kelley, What Should Be the
Standards for Intervening Between Parent and Child? The Parental Prosecution for a
Young Boy’s Obesity, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 7, 8–10 (2001) (discussing the case of an
obese four-year-old boy, who was placed in foster care and whose parents were charged
with criminal neglect); see also Lindsey Murtagh, Judicial Interventions for Morbidly
Obese Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 497, 497 (2007) (noting that “courts in
California, Iowa, Indiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Texas . . . have recognized
morbid obesity as an issue warranting state intervention into the family unit”).
147. See, e.g., Marshall L. Wilde, Bioethical and Legal Implications of Pediatric
Gastric Bypass, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 575, 576 (2004) (“The modern recognition of
pediatric obesity as a threat to long-term health has given rise to a legal recognition that
parents who fail to treat their child’s obesity can be held accountable for medical
neglect.”).
148. E.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), vacated in part and remanded, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) (suit against
McDonald’s filed by parents of two obese teenagers alleging deceptive acts, negligence,
and failure to warn); M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93
GEO. L.J. 1335, 1356 (2005) (arguing that “[f]oods that fail the consumer expectations or
risk-utility tests for defective design should be subject to liability” but also predicting
that “the difficulty of proving causation-in-fact (by tying a food product to a person’s
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forms of regulation to combat the “obesity epidemic”149 have been
proposed.150
Obesity may well be the leading cause of preventable deaths in the
United States.151 Obesity is responsible for 300,000 deaths per year, and
people who are obese have a fifty to one hundred percent increased risk
of premature death from weight-related health problems.152 The Social
Security Administration regards obesity as a potential disability.153 In
2004, the Health and Human Services Secretary announced that Medicare
would begin to pay for some types of obesity treatments, noting that
“[o]besity is a critical public health problem in our country that causes
millions of Americans to suffer unnecessary health problems and to die
prematurely.”154 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
obesity “substantially” increases the risk of death from such causes as
illness) will typically preclude pro-plaintiff judgments”); Rogan Kersh & James A.
Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 839, 863 (2005) (“Tort lawyers have filed dozens of class-action suits on
behalf of obese litigants.”); Jeremy H. Rogers, Note, Living on the Fat of the Land: How
to Have Your Burger and Sue It Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 883 (2003) (recommending
class action lawsuits against “Big Food”).
149. Marlene B. Schwartz & Kelly D. Brownell, Actions Necessary to Prevent
Childhood Obesity: Creating the Climate for Change, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 78, 78
(2007) (noting the use of “terms like ‘epidemic,’ ‘crisis,’ and ‘emergency’”).
150. See Kelly D. Brownell, Get Slim With Higher Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1994, at A29; Hanna Rosin, The Fat Tax, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 19, cited in
Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) To Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer,
93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1375 (2005); Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role
of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1224–27 (2005)
(discussing “junk-food taxes” and “fat taxes”).
151. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND
OBESITY 8 (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/
CalltoAction.pdf [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION].
152. David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing
Congress’s Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 358
(2007) (citing SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION, supra note 151, at 8); see also
WORLD HEALTH ORG., TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 894, OBESITY: PREVENTING AND
MANAGING THE GLOBAL EPIDEMIC 2 (2000) (describing obesity as “one of the most
significant contributors to ill health” and “a key risk factor in the natural history of other
chronic and noncommunicable diseases”).
153. See Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security’s
Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 221 n.1 (2007)
(“SSA also acknowledges that obesity is a medically determinable impairment that may,
on its own, warrant a finding of disability.” (citing Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of
Obesity, S.S.R. 00-3p (Cum. Ed. 2000))).
154. Press Release, HHS Announces Revised Medicare Obesity Coverage Policy
(July 15, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040715.html.
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hypertension, type II diabetes, coronary artery disease, stroke, gallbladder
disease, and respiratory illnesses, as well as some cancers.155 Furthermore,
“[h]igher body weights are also associated with an increase in mortality
from all causes.”156
b. Diabetes
Diabetes is a metabolic illness.157 Type I diabetes is caused when the
body’s immune system destroys the pancreatic cells that produce insulin,
a hormone that regulates conversion of glucose to energy.158 People
with type I diabetes must receive insulin by either injection or a pump.159
People with type II diabetes initially produce insulin but their cells do
not properly absorb it.160 Over time, though, the pancreas loses its ability to
produce insulin.161 Type II diabetes may be treatable with oral medication,
although more severe cases require treatment with insulin.162
When the body lacks sufficient insulin, glucose builds up in the
bloodstream, producing a condition called hyperglycemia.163 If untreated,
hyperglycemia can lead to ketoacidosis, which can progress to a diabetic
coma.164 High blood glucose levels also may damage the eyes, causing
blurred vision and possibly leading to blindness.165 Damage to nerves in
any part of the body is another possible consequence of high blood
glucose levels.166 Diabetes can damage both the nerves and the blood
vessels to the feet, causing poor circulation and possibly leading to
155. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PUBL’N NO. 00-4084, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE:
IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN
ADULTS 5 (2000), available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/prctgd_c.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Corinne P. Maskaleris, Understanding Type II Diabetes: A Primer, 16
EXPERIENCE 40, 40 (2006); see also Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Type 1 Diabetes, http://www.
diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
158. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET: GENERAL INFORMATION AND NATIONAL
ESTIMATES ON DIABETES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2003), available at http://www.
cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs_2003.pdf [hereinafter DIABETES FACT SHEET].
159. Id. at 2.
160. Id. at 1.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2.
163. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Hyperglycemia, http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes/
hyperglycemia.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
164. DIABETES FACT SHEET, supra note 158, at 7 (“Uncontrolled diabetes often
leads to biochemical imbalances that can cause acute life-threatening events, such as
diabetic ketoacidosis and hyperosmolar (nonketotic) coma.”).
165. Id. (“Diabetes is the leading cause of new cases of blindness among adults
aged 20–74 years.”).
166. High blood glucose levels can cause several types of nerve damage, or diabetic
neuropathies. See Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Diabetic Neuropathy (Nerve Damage) and Diabetes,
http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes/diabetic-neuropathy.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
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amputation.167 High blood glucose levels, especially if combined with
high blood pressure, can also cause kidney damage and lead to end-stage
renal disease—kidney failure requiring dialysis or a transplant.168 People
with diabetes are more likely to die from pneumonia or influenza, and
are more likely to suffer a stroke, than are people who do not have
diabetes.169 Diabetes, especially in people with high blood pressure and
high cholesterol, causes heart disease, which is the leading cause of
death among people with diabetes.170 In 2002, diabetes was the sixth
leading cause of death in the United States.171
C. The Inadequacies of Medical Appropriateness
Sell charges courts with the task of deciding whether involuntary
antipsychotic medications are “medically appropriate,” which the Court
defines as “in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical
condition.”172 For several reasons, this medical appropriateness standard
does little if anything to guarantee that the harms of involuntary
antipsychotic medications will be justified by the government’s interest
in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial. One problem with
medical appropriateness is that in applying this standard, many courts
have deferred more or less completely to government physicians’
statements that antipsychotic medications are “the standard of care” for
people diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. For example, the court in
United States v. Archuleta decided, “[A]s to the medical appropriateness
of medication, the doctor stated that ‘antipsychotic medication is the
standard of care for psychosis, and in Mr. Archuleta’s case, schizophrenia,
167. DIABETES FACT SHEET, supra note 158, at 7 (“More than 60% of nontraumatic
lower-limb amputations occur among people with diabetes.”).
168. Id. at 6 (“Diabetes is the leading cause of end-stage renal disease, accounting
for 44 percent of new cases [in 2002].”).
169. Id. Additionally, “[p]eople with diabetes are more susceptible to many other
illnesses and, once they acquire these illnesses, often have worse prognoses.” Id.
170. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Cardiovascular
disease affects millions of adults with diabetes and is a major cause of morbidity and
mortality among persons with diabetes. In 2003, 5.2 million persons aged 35 years and
older with diabetes reported being diagnosed with a cardiovascular disease condition
(i.e., coronary heart disease, stroke, or other heart condition).” Ctrs. for Disease Control
and Prevention, Number (in millions) of Persons with Diabetes Aged 35 Years and Older
with Self-Reported CVD Conditions, United States, 1997–2003, http://www.cdc.gov/
diabetes/statistics/cvd/fig1.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
171. DIABETES FACT SHEET, supra note 158, at 6.
172. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003).
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it is the only effective treatment for it.’”173 The court’s consideration of
medical appropriateness in United States v. Renshaw was similarly
concise: “[T]he Court finds the administration of the antipsychotic
medication is medically appropriate. The Forensic Evaluation indicates
that the administration of antipsychotic medication is a standard component
of treatment for anyone with the Defendant’s mental condition.”174 And
in United States v. Cortez-Perez: “Defendant suffers from Chronic
Schizophrenia which will not likely be controlled without standard
medication. The proposed medication is [the] widely available standard
treatment for persons suffering from the serious mental illness that the
Defendant suffers.”175
On one hand, the equation of medical appropriateness with the
standard of care for schizophrenia cannot be what the Sell Court
intended, because if medical appropriateness were nothing more than the
standard of care, then antipsychotics would be appropriate for every
defendant diagnosed with schizophrenia—and the medical appropriateness
standard would be rendered meaningless.
Perhaps, however, trial courts should not be criticized too harshly for
these circumventions of Sell’s intent, because it is not apparent how,
under Sell, courts could do much better. Antipsychotic medications are
in fact the standard of care for schizophrenia. And antipsychotic medications
are generally medically appropriate for people with schizophrenia. All
antipsychotics do have the potential to cause very disabling and even
life-threatening side effects.176 But given that schizophrenia is itself

173. 218 F. App’x 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2007). A few courts have taken the medical
appropriateness question more seriously. For example, in United States v. McCray, 474
F. Supp. 2d 671 (D.N.J. 2007), the court denied the government’s motion for involuntary
medication, in part because:
[T]he risk of Defendant suffering serious side effects is not insubstantial.
When the risks of serious side effects are balanced against the questions that
exist affecting the potential effectiveness of drug treatment, the Court cannot
conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the potential benefits that
outweigh the substantial risks.
Id. at 682. A few courts, though, grant the government’s motion with only the most
cursory attention to medical appropriateness. E.g., United States v. Ballesteros, No.
2:04-CR-0144-GEB, 2006 WL 224437, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) (“Dr. Sarrazin’s
testimony that the administration of the described antipsychotic medications is medically
appropriate is credited.”); United States v. Martin, No. 1:04MJ00183, 2005 WL
1895110, at * 4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2005) (“Finally, I find that the administration of the
recommended medication is medically appropriate.”).
174. United States v. Renshaw, No. 4:06CR-31-M, 2007 WL 2746675, at *2 (W.D.
Ky. Sept. 18, 2007).
175. United States v. Cortez-Perez, No. 06-CR-1290-WQH, 2007 WL 2695867, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007).
176. See supra Part III.B (discussing side effects of antipsychotic medications).
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very disabling177 and even life-threatening,178 it is the rare person with
schizophrenia for whom antipsychotic medications can be declared
medically inappropriate.
That antipsychotic medications are not medically inappropriate,
though, does not mean that these medications cannot be unreasonably
harmful when administered for the purpose of rendering a defendant
competent to stand trial. When someone with schizophrenia chooses to
take antipsychotic medications voluntarily, for the purpose of alleviating
his own psychotic symptoms, then it is sensible to assume that for that
person, the benefits justify the harms. But when the government seeks
to administer antipsychotic medications involuntarily, for the purpose of
advancing the government’s interest in bringing a defendant to trial, a
court should decide whether the benefits to the government justify the
harms to the defendant.179
Several commentators have proposed that under Sell, courts should
interpret “medically appropriate” to mean treatment that, in a civil
context, a physician would be willing to prescribe.180 But harms that a
patient is willing to accept for herself, when she concludes that the
benefits to her own well-being are worth those harms, are not necessarily
the same harms that a court should accept for her, when the purpose of

177. See Kim T. Mueser & Susan R. McGurk, Schizophrenia, 363 LANCET 2063,
2063 (2004) (“Schizophrenia is a mental illness that is among the world’s top ten causes
of long-term disability.”). For a compelling first-person account of schizophrenia, see
generally ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS
(2007).
178. Schizophrenia is associated with “an alarmingly high” rate of suicide. Alan
Breier, Introduction: A New Era in the Pharmacotherapy of Psychotic Disorders, 62 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (SUPPLEMENT 2) 3, 3 (2001); see also JULIEN, supra note 115, at
337 (reporting that “approximately 10 to 15 percent of individuals with schizophrenia
take their own lives, usually within the first 10 years of developing the disorder”).
179. This is why the issue of side effects is not a strictly medical one. The decision
to be made is not whether the benefits to the defendant justify the risk of side effects but
rather whether the benefits to the government justify the risk of side effects. See supra
note 70.
180. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1114, 1130 (2008) (proposing that medical appropriateness be defined as treatment that
is “the ‘right treatment for the condition,’ assuming the defendant was not on trial”);
Rebekah W. Page, Comment, Forcible Medication and the Fourth Amendment: A New
Framework for Protecting Nondangerous Mentally Ill Pretrial Detainees Against
Unreasonable Governmental Intrusions into the Body, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1087
(2005) (arguing that “there should be a separate, medical determination that
antipsychotic medication is the best treatment option for the patient, regardless of the
government’s interest in the matter”).
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administering the medications is to benefit the government. Put
differently, should the fact that some people decide to take antipsychotic
medications voluntarily for the purpose of enhancing their own wellbeing help to justify a court’s decision to compel people to take these
medications involuntarily for the purpose of furthering the government’s
interest in bringing them to trial? It is hard to imagine that the answer
should be anything other than no: Administering a voluntary medication
that both benefits and harms the individual who is taking the medication
is very different from administering an involuntary medication that
benefits the government and harms the individual.181
Some courts have proposed that administering involuntary antipsychotic
medications does benefit as well as harm the defendant, even if it also
benefits the government. For example, in approving involuntary medication
for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial, the
court in United States v. Algere wrote that “[t]he proposed treatment has
numerous potential positive effects and is expected to significantly improve
Algere’s quality of life.”182 It is of course true that schizophrenia is a
disease that causes tremendous suffering, and it is also true that
antipsychotic medications often alleviate at least some of that suffering.
But as the court explained in United States v. Dumeny, “[t]he issue
before the court is not whether Mr. Dumeny should voluntarily accept
treatment, but whether the court should order him to do so against his
will.”183 Justifying involuntary medication on the grounds that it will
benefit the defendant fails to take adequate account of the defendant’s
own decision not to take the medications voluntarily. If the defendant
believed that the medication’s benefits to him justified the medication’s
harms, he would choose to take the medication voluntarily.184 And
181. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Winston v. Lee, explaining
that voluntary general anesthesia is different from involuntary general anesthesia:
When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring general
anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a case, the
surgeon is carrying out the patient’s own will concerning the patient’s body
and the patient’s right to privacy is therefore preserved. In this case, however,
the Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth proposes to take control of
respondent’s body, to “drug this citizen—not yet convicted of a criminal
offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness,”
and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery
involves a virtually total divestment of respondent’s ordinary control over
surgical probing beneath his skin.
470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985) (citation omitted).
182. United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 746 (E.D. La. 2005).
183. United States v. Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Me. 2004).
184. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (explaining that “a medical
doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure he is prescribing,
the risks of a decision not to undergo the treatment, and the probability of a successful
outcome of the treatment” but that “[t]he weighing of these risks against the individual
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while some people with schizophrenia are incapable of understanding
the harms and benefits of antipsychotic medications, courts deem such
people incompetent to make their own medical treatment decisions and
appoint others to make those decisions for them.185 Most defendants
who are incompetent to stand trial, though, have not been ruled incompetent
to make their own medical treatment decisions.186 Moreover, the

subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill”—instead, it is “a
nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient alone”); Kevin W. Williams, Managing
Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private
Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 50 (2004) (noting that “the patient’s best
interest” is not necessarily the same as “the best medical treatment in a given situation”
because the patient’s best interest cannot be determined without considering “the
individual patient’s philosophical, moral, and religious beliefs; economic constraints;
family situation; and a myriad of other interests to which the physician is not privy”).
185. See William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of
Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 1002 (1998)
(“The state interest in forcibly medicating patients in order to provide treatment to
legally competent patients who could benefit from treatment is not sufficiently
compelling. It is well-settled that the government may not confine for compulsory
treatment individuals who are mentally ill, but are not dangerous.” (citing Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576
(1975); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975))).
186. Russell Weston, for example, was administered involuntary medications for
more than two years but was never found to be incompetent to make his own medical
decisions. See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 112 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Despite
the defendant’s suggestion that the Court determine whether he is functionally competent
to make medical decisions and, if he is not, to appoint a guardian ad litem, the defendant
has failed to present any evidence to contradict Dr. Johnson’s opinion that he is
competent to consent to the medication.” (emphasis omitted)). One scholar has argued
that “virtually all defendants who are incompetent to stand trial are also incompetent to
make treatment decisions.” CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT
DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 230 (2006); see also
Robert F. Schopp, Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the Criminal
Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 495, 503–08 (2006)
(proposing that incompetent criminal defendants are necessarily incompetent to make
medical treatment decisions, although arguably assuming a standard of competency to
make medical treatment decisions that is more demanding than any actual standard). It
is most likely true that a good many more defendants do lack the capacity to understand
the harms and benefits of antipsychotic medications than are currently being found
incompetent to make treatment decisions. But there are reasons why a defendant might
be incompetent to stand trial but nevertheless be competent to make treatment decisions.
One reason is that tests of competency to make treatment decisions are usually narrowly
focused cognitive tests that do not take account of impairments in emotion, volition, or
other psychological functions, or even of cognitive capacities unrelated to understanding
the direct harms and benefits of medications. See Marsha Garrison, The Empire of
Illness: Competence and Coercion in Health-Care Decisionmaking, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 781, 789–90 (2007) (“What these varied tests [of competence to make treatment
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government cannot add together all of the incidental benefits of
antipsychotic medications to justify involuntary administration of these
medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand
trial. If rendering the defendant competent to stand trial is the government
interest that justifies the involuntary medications, then whether the
medications benefit the defendant is irrelevant. If benefit to the
individual were the government interest that justified the involuntary
medications, as it is in some civil commitments, then the government
would need to satisfy the requirements of such a commitment—
requirements that usually include dangerousness to self as well as
incompetence to make medical treatment decisions.187
In sum, the “medically appropriate” standard allows trial courts to all
but ignore the harms that a defendant might experience if administered
involuntary antipsychotic medications—even though the harms might
outweigh the benefit the government will derive from administering the
medications. Asking whether antipsychotic medications are medically
appropriate inadequately protects defendants from harms that are not
justified by a sufficiently important government interest, because if the
defendant has been properly diagnosed with schizophrenia, the answer
will almost invariably be yes, regardless of how substantial the risk of
harms—or even how substantial the experience of actual harms—and
regardless of how important the government’s interest in bringing the
defendant to trial, so long as the government’s interest is some degree of
“important.” Instead, what courts should ask is whether the government’s
interest in bringing the defendant to trial is important enough to justify
the harms of involuntary antipsychotic medications.

decisions] share is an exclusive focus on cognitive capacity. A patient may be confused,
combative, depressed, or despairing. But if she can accurately describe the treatment
choice, its corollary risks, and its potential benefits to her, she is competent to consent
under all existing standards.”). Moreover, some defendants are incompetent to stand
trial because of circumscribed delusional beliefs about some aspect of the trial process.
See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text (describing delusional beliefs of some
defendants found incompetent to stand trial). But so long as the defendant’s delusional
system does not encompass his physicians or other medical professionals, or drug
manufacturers, it is possible that a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial could be
capable of making a competent decision regarding his own medical treatment.
187. Cf. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (“We emphasize that the
court applying these standards is seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of
drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the
interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.”).
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IV. LESSONS FROM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: HOW MUCH
HARM CAN ONE TRIAL JUSTIFY?
A. “Risk, Trauma, or Pain”
In Winston and Schmerber, the Supreme Court was reluctant to allow
involuntary medical treatment for the purpose of advancing the
government’s interests if the treatment the government sought to order
was likely to cause any physical harms at all.188 Compared to the physical
harms that Lee might have experienced as a result of bullet removal
surgery,189 the physical harms that defendants might experience, and in
some cases have actually experienced, as a result of involuntary antipsychotic
medications are arguably at least as substantial.190
No court has allowed the government to compel a defendant to submit
to what the court has deemed “major surgery” for the purpose of promoting
the government’s interest in obtaining evidence of a crime: Whenever a
court finds that a proposed surgical procedure is “major,” the government’s
request to compel the surgery is denied.191 In denying these requests,

188. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
189. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing risks to Lee of bullet
removal surgery).
190. See supra Part III.B (discussing risks of antipsychotic medications).
191. On one hand are the courts that find a proposed involuntary surgery to be
major and then deny the government’s request to compel the defendant to undergo the
surgery. E.g., Bowden v. State, 510 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ark. 1974) (disallowing “major
intrusion into the petitioner’s body involving trauma, pain and possible risk of life even
when performed in a proper medical environment with the most careful and skilled
attention”); People v. Smith, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (“[T]he
proposed operation would constitute a major intrusion into the body of the respondent
that would involve trauma and pain and a possible risk of life and is over and beyond the
minor intrusion standard set down in Schmerber v. California.”); State v. Allen, 291
S.E.2d 459, 463 (S.C. 1982) (finding that removing bullet would require “major surgery
procedures involving a substantial intrusion into [the defendant’s] body and risk to his
health, safety or life”); cf. United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 261 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D.P.R.
2003) (denying government request for involuntary surgery because court could not
conclude that the surgery would not threaten the defendant’s safety); Bloom v. Starkey,
409 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (same). On the other hand are the courts
that find a proposed involuntary surgery not to be major and then grant the government’s
request to compel the defendant to undergo the surgery. E.g., United States v. Crowder,
543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The operation was minor . . . .”); Hughes v. United
States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1341 (D.C. 1981) (accepting trial court’s finding that “the
removal of the presumed bullets from under appellant’s skin would be a minor surgical
procedure involving virtually no risk”); Creamer v. Georgia, 192 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga.
1972) (concluding that “the removal of the bullet from the defendant’s body would

197

KLEIN.UPDATEDPRINTER

3/12/2009 10:14:37 AM

courts cite the “risk, trauma, or pain” that major surgery involves.192 But
the “risk, trauma, or pain” that attends antipsychotic medications can be
just as great. It is inconceivable that a court that has denied involuntary
surgery because the defendant might suffer an infection or tissue
damage would, given an equivalently important government interest,
allow involuntary medications when the defendant might develop
tardive dyskinesia or diabetes.
B. Measuring the Government’s Interest in Criminal Prosecutions
Under Sell, courts must decide whether the government’s interest in
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial is “important.”193 In some
ways, this inquiry resembles the Fourth Amendment balancing of
individual harms and government benefits.194 The difference, though, is
that the Sell inquiry regarding the weight of the government’s interest is
not one side of a test that directly compares harms and benefits but
rather is, like “medical appropriateness,” a categorical or threshold test.
Unlike the Fourth Amendment cases, courts do not ask whether the
government’s interest is important enough to justify the harms of involuntary
treatment. Instead, courts ask simply whether the government’s interest
meets some abstract or absolute measure of “important.”
Courts have struggled to identify criteria that will allow them to
classify the government’s interest in bringing defendants to trial as either
“important” or “not important.” One initial problem is that in some sense,
the government’s interest in prosecuting every criminal charge against

amount to a minor intrusion into his person”); State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505, 506
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (“There would [be] no danger to life, limb, tissue, muscle, or
ligaments.”); State v. Avila, 910 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. App. 1994) (“[T]he threat, if
any, to Avila’s health and safety was minimal.”); Allen, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (finding “that
the bullet lodged superficially beneath Allen’s skin could be removed, without any harm
or risk of life or injury, by minor surgery and under local anesthetic”).
192. E.g., Bowden, 510 S.W.2d at 881 (refusing to order removal of bullet because
“[i]t is uncontroverted that the proposed operation constitutes medically a major
intrusion into the petitioner’s body involving trauma, pain and possible risk of life even
when performed in a proper medical environment with the most careful and skilled
attention”); Allen, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (“I find that removal of the bullet from the
defendant, Walter Childers, Jr., would require major surgery procedures involving a
substantial intrusion into his body and risk to his health, safety or life.”); see also
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (setting forth “risk, trauma, or pain”
as a factor influencing reasonableness of involuntary treatment).
193. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
194. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761, 765 (1985) (including the
government’s need for the evidence that might be obtained as a factor for courts to
consider when assessing reasonableness); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (finding involuntary
blood test did not violate Fourth Amendment in part because it was “highly effective” in
identifying drunk drivers).
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every defendant is important.195 On the other hand, though, Sell requires
that courts consider the government’s interest in prosecuting some charges
against some defendants to be important and its interest in prosecuting
other charges against other defendants to be not important.196 Identifying
which charges against which defendants are serious enough to make the
government’s interest in prosecuting those charges “important,” and
which are not, is a more complex task than at first it might seem.197
One measure that many courts have used to assess the seriousness of
criminal charges is the sentence that a defendant will receive if found
guilty. This approach has a certain logical simplicity: The greater the
sentence, the more serious must be the charge. But beneath this surface
simplicity lies the not-at-all simple question whether to measure a
defendant’s prospective sentence in terms of the statutory maximum or
in terms of an expected guidelines range. For example, in Archuleta the
defendant was charged with providing false information—lying about a
prior mental health commitment—in the acquisition of a firearm.198 The
government argued that the charge was serious because the statutory
maximum sentence was ten years.199 Archuleta argued that the relevant
punishment was the expected sentence under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, which according to Archuleta was at most between
twelve to sixteen months.200 Archuleta further argued that this expected
sentence, combined with the fact that he had already been in custody
almost that long, made the government’s interest in rendering him
competent to stand trial not important.201 Most courts that look to
sentencing to determine whether the government’s interest in rendering a
195. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“[T]he Government seeks to protect through
application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.”); Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1992) (“Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is
fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and
peace.” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
196. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“[A] court must find that important governmental
interests are at stake.”); id. at 179 (“[T]he Constitution permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious
criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial . . . .”).
197. For a comprehensive discussion of the difficulties involved in assessing the
weight of the government’s interest in adjudicating different criminal charges, see
generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1957 (2004).
198. United States v. Archuleta, 218 F. App’x 754, 755 (10th Cir. 2007).
199. Id. at 758.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 758–59.
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defendant competent to stand trial is important conclude what the
Archuleta court concluded, that the statutory maximum is the proper
measure of the government’s interest, 202 although some courts have
ruled that an expected guidelines sentence is the proper measure.203
Another yardstick that some courts have used to assess seriousness is
how a legislature has designated the charges. Not surprisingly, the
government’s interest in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial is
more likely to be found to be important when the charges against the
defendant are “felonies,” while the interest in rendering competent to
stand trial a defendant charged with “misdemeanors,” or with offenses
that are otherwise not felonies, such as probation violations, is less likely
to be important.204
A few courts have rejected any bright-line rules for measuring the
seriousness of criminal charges. These courts’ inquiries, which are quite
fact-intensive, come close to the kind of balancing test that asks whether
the government’s interest in bringing a particular defendant to trial is
important enough to justify the harms of involuntary treatment.205 In
202. Id. at 759; Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1114, 1126 (2008) (“Most courts have judged the importance of bringing a
defendant to trial based on the maximum penalty the defendant could face if
convicted.”). In these cases, courts often state that they are following the Supreme
Court’s approach to determining seriousness when the question is whether the defendant
has a right to a jury trial. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir.
2005) (“In Duncan v. Louisiana . . . the Supreme Court observed that the Sixth
Amendment’s right to trial by jury exists only in ‘serious’ criminal cases . . . . More
recent right-to-jury cases have explicitly found that the primary measure of seriousness is
‘the maximum penalty attached to the offense.’” (citations omitted)). Other courts cite
the objectivity of statutory maximums. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538,
549 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the maximum statutory penalty is the most objective
means of determining the seriousness of a crime and the standard we adopt”).
203. E.g., United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 506 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2007)
(using the predicted guidelines sentence, rather than the statutory maximum, to measure
seriousness); United States v. Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (W.D. Mo. 2007)
(same); United States v. Schloming, No. 05-5017 (TJB), 2006 WL 1320078, at *6 (D.
N.J. May 12, 2006) (“Had it been the Supreme Court’s intention to classify a charge as
serious based on the maximum penalty, it could have done so.”).
204. E.g., Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098, 1102 (Wash. 2005) (“The government
simply does not have the same interest in prosecuting misdemeanant defendants as it
does in prosecuting defendants charged with felonies.”); United States v. Kourey, 276 F.
Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D. W.Va. 2003) (“Defendant is not facing serious criminal charges
upon which he will be tried. Rather, Defendant is charged with violating the terms and
conditions of his supervised release imposed for his admitted commission of a Class A
misdemeanor.”). But see United States v. Everage, No. 05–11–DLB, 2006 WL 1007274,
at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2006) (“Although Defendant is charged with two misdemeanors,
they both allegedly involve threats to others, one with a firearm. The Court therefore
concludes Defendant is charged with serious crimes.”).
205. Although most courts do not undertake it, the fact-intensive inquiry is what
Sell mandates: Courts “must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the
Government’s interest in prosecution.” 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
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United States v. Lindauer, for example, Susan Lindauer—whom every
mental health expert, government as well as defense, agreed experienced
paranoid and grandiose delusions that made her incompetent to stand
trial206—was charged with acting and conspiring to act as an unregistered
agent of the foreign country of Iraq.207 Rather than consult any objective
measure, such as the statutory maximum sentences or the legislature’s
classifications of the charges, the court considered the improbability that
Lindauer’s actions could have caused any real harm. The court observed
that Lindauer “could not act successfully as an agent of the Iraqi
government without in some way influencing normal people . . . and the
record shows that even lay people recognize that she is seriously
disturbed.”208 Similarly, in United States v. Dumeny, the court decided
that despite being charged with an offense that carried a ten-year
statutory maximum sentence, Jason Dumeny could not be administered
involuntary medications because the one charge against him—possession of
a firearm by a person previously committed to mental health treatment—
did not involve any violence.209
Many cases are like Dumeny, cases in which the seriousness of the
charges against the defendant is debatable. These are the cases in which
a balancing test could make the most difference in protecting the
defendant’s interest in avoiding unreasonable harms: If the importance

206. United States v. Lindauer, 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“At
least a half dozen mental health professionals, including a psychologist and a psychiatrist
retained by the defense, and several psychologists and psychiatrists employed, and one
psychiatrist retained, by the government, have found her mentally incompetent to stand
trial . . . .”).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 571; see also id. at 571–72 (“[T]here is no indication that Lindauer ever
came close to influencing anyone, or could have. The indictment charges only what it
describes as an unsuccessful attempt to influence an unnamed government
official . . . .”).
209. 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132–33 (D. Me. 2004). The court reasoned that:
Mr. Dumeny is currently charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) with possession
of firearms by a person previously committed to a mental health institute.
Without diminishing the potential seriousness of this charge, which carries
significant potential penalties, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), it is noteworthy that
Mr. Dumeny has been charged with possession only. He has not been charged
with improper use of the firearms. Although the Forensic Evaluation Report
makes reference to Mr. Dumeny’s violent proclivities, the only criminal charge
before the court at this time is the possession charge. This court concludes in
view of the pending charge, the government interest at stake is insufficient for
this court to mandate intrusive involuntary treatment of Mr. Dumeny.
Id.
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of the government’s interest is unclear, then a high risk of side effects, or
even a low risk of more serious side effects, should cause a court to rule
that involuntary antipsychotics are not justified, while a low risk of
minor side effects would support a decision allowing involuntary
antipsychotics.
In some cases, though, the charges against the defendant are
unquestionably very serious. Russell Weston, for example, was charged
with two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder after he
opened fire in the U.S. Capitol building, killing two guards and
wounding a third.210 In Weston, one of the district court’s opinions stated
that “if a compelling case ever existed . . . that would justify forcibly
medicating the defendant solely to become competent to stand trial, this
case clearly meets that standard,”211 while the D.C. Circuit wrote that
“[t]he government’s interest in finding, convicting, and punishing
criminals reaches its zenith when the crime is the murder of federal
police officers.”212
When the charges against an incompetent defendant are clearly very
serious, the government’s interest in rendering the defendant competent
to stand trial will likely be important enough to justify the harms of
involuntary antipsychotic medications. But even in cases involving charges
that are clearly very serious, some “special circumstances” might
diminish the government’s interest in bringing a particular defendant to

210. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d
873 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001); United States v. Weston, 69 F.
Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 1999), rev’d, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Russell Weston, fortythree years old with a long history of mental illness, believed that the world was
threatened by “Black Heva,” a deadly plague that Weston could stop by accessing a
secret time machine located in the “great safe of the U.S. Senate.” Weston further
believed, according to the report of a prison psychiatrist who evaluated him, that:
While “working for NASA” in the early 1980’s, he developed a “Ruby
Satellite System,” a powerful reverse time machine that enables users to “push
time in reverse . . . by passing us through the Jurassic Sea, putting us into
another time frame.” For those like Weston with access to the “Ruby Satellite
System,” nothing is permanent—the user can simply reverse time. If
convicted and executed, Weston will “simply be time reversed, put into a safe
in the Capitol, and be able to resume his life at whatever point he chooses.”
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring).
The Weston cases were decided before Sell, but like Sell they relied on Harper and
Riggins. See, e.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 876 (“In Washington v. Harper and later in
Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court recognized that the government may, under
certain circumstances, forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a prisoner or
criminal defendant despite his liberty interest, provided such medication is ‘medically
appropriate.’”); Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 105–06 (discussing Harper and Riggins).
211. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
212. Weston, 255 F.3d at 881.
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trial.213 For example, when a defendant is charged with committing
especially serious crimes, like Weston, the government’s interest in
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial will sometimes be
diminished, at least to some extent, by the ability to detain under civil
commitment statutes defendants who are both mentally ill and
dangerous—like Weston.214 Perhaps ironically, one outcome for the
defendant might well be the same—involuntary antipsychotic medications—
whether a court allows such medications for the purpose of diminishing
the defendant’s dangerousness or for the purpose of rendering him
competent to stand trial. Still, there might be some advantages to pursuing
civil commitment rather than a criminal trial. In some cases, civil
commitment might be more likely than criminal prosecution to promote
effective long-term treatment of the defendant’s mental illness, a result
that would benefit both the defendant and the government.215 For
213. The Sell Court referred to factors that might diminish the government’s interest
in bringing a defendant to trial as “[s]pecial circumstances.” Sell v. United States, 539
U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (“Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest
[in prosecution].”).
214. Id. (“The defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy
confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the risks that
ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious
crime.”). Indeed, when the court ruled that continued involuntary medication was not
likely to render Weston competent to stand trial, Weston was committed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246, which allows for the civil commitment of someone previously detained as
incompetent to stand trial if that person “is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 4246
(LexisNexis 2008); see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 4241 (LexisNexis 2008) (“If, at the end of the
time period specified, it is determined that the defendant’s mental condition has not so
improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the
provisions of sections 4246 and 4248.”); United States v. Weston, No. 98–357 (EGS),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23579, at *2–6 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2004).
215. Effective long-term treatment of those defendants whose criminal acts were
committed while they were actively mentally ill—Weston again, for example—promotes
the criminal justice goal of deterring future criminal acts. Of course, civil commitment
cannot satisfy all of the goals of the criminal justice system. See United States v.
Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The civil commitment argument . . .
ignores the retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative functions of the
criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that offenders receive their just deserts, to
make clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover what happened through the
public mechanism of trial.”); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 186, at 230 (agreeing with
the Weston court that civil commitment is an inadequate substitute for criminal
prosecution). But not even criminal prosecutions usually satisfy all of the goals of the
criminal justice system. Plea bargains, for example, are a common compromise between
prosecutors, who offer lesser sentences, and criminal defendants, who in exchange for
these lesser sentences give up their rights to a fair trial. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
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example, civil commitment might be more likely to keep the defendant in
the community, to include psychosocial therapies in addition to antipsychotic
medications, and to foster a therapeutic relationship between the defendant
and his treatment providers. Involuntary medications administered for
the purpose of diminishing a defendant’s dangerousness are of course
involuntary, but involuntary medications administered for the purpose of
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial are not only involuntary
but also adversarial. Administering antipsychotic medications that are
both involuntary and adversarial will perhaps make the defendant’s
experience doubly aversive and will perhaps thereby diminish the
chances that he will respond favorably to the involuntary treatment and
will then choose to continue to receive treatment voluntarily once the
conditions that justify the involuntary treatment have ended.
An additional consideration that might diminish the government’s
interest is that even when administering involuntary medications succeeds
in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, the government’s
interest that has been advanced is the interest in prosecuting the charges
against only that one particular defendant. In contrast, in some cases,
such as Schmerber, an involuntary medical procedure, such as a blood
test, advances a broader government interest, such as the interest in
administering the whole system of drunk driving laws.216 The inability to
bring to trial any single, individual defendant does not threaten the whole
system of criminal prosecutions.217 Thus, even when the charges against an
incompetent defendant are undeniably serious, the government’s interest
in bringing the defendant to trial might not always be important enough
to justify the harms of involuntary antipsychotic medications.

Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) (referring to prosecutors
“purchasing procedural entitlements with lower sentences”); Ronald Wright & Marc
Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (2003)
(“Extremely low trial rates, perhaps in conjunction with low acquittal rates, may
indirectly suggest the presence of an excessive trial penalty, and the diminution of justice
that comes with it.”).
216. See supra note 93.
217. See Michael K. Gottlieb, Executions and Torture: The Consequences of
Overriding Professional Ethics, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 351, 373 (2006)
(“It is not the criminal justice system, en toto, that is being obstructed or impeded.
Rather it is the prescribed justice in a particular case in which a certain punishment . . . is
undeliverable.”); Michael G. Rogers, Bodily Intrusion in Search of Evidence: A Study in
Fourth Amendment Decisionmaking, 62 IND. L.J. 1181, 1199 (1987) (“The blood
tests . . . served a substantial public interest in deterring drunk driving. The blood tests
also provided reliable scientific evidence that would be more useful in court than
alternative evidence . . . . Bullet-retrieval surgery, however, serves no public interest
beyond bringing a particular criminal to justice.” (footnote omitted)).
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V. CONCLUSION
Under the due process test that the Supreme Court developed in
Harper, Riggins, and Sell, trial courts routinely permit the government to
administer involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent criminal
defendants because such medications are “medically appropriate” for
defendants diagnosed with schizophrenia and because the government’s
interest in prosecuting criminal charges is “important.”218 But these
separate categorical or threshold standards fail to adequately protect
incompetent criminal defendants from harms that are not justified by the
government’s interest in bringing them to trial. A test like the Fourth
Amendment’s balancing test, which would require courts to weigh the
defendant’s interest in avoiding the harms of involuntary antipsychotic
medications directly against the government’s interest in rendering the
defendant competent to stand trial, would better ensure that incompetent
criminal defendants are not subject to harms that are unreasonable.

218. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226–27 (1990).
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